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JUDICIAL FEDERALISM: CURRENT TRENDS AND
LONG-TERM PROSPECTS
STANLEY H. FRIEDELBAUM*
I. INTRODUCTION AND RETROSPECTIVEC HARACTERIZATIONS of the United States Supreme Court, a
collegial body whose members are protected by constitutional
tenure and are served by a venerable tradition of independence, are
difficult to adduce with any degree of precision or protracted depend-
ability. The Court is a tribunal capable at times of strange alliances
and puzzling enigmas, such as those in the flag desecration cases of
1989 and 1990'-decisions that brought the nation to the brink of cri-
sis and the possible attenuation of guarantees of expressive freedom
by constitutional amendment. Yet, notwithstanding sporadic aberra-
tions attributable to unexpected coalitions, the Rehnquist Court must
be treated as a discrete entity, no longer at a crossroads or in a transi-
tional state like its predecessor. Unlike the moderation and gradualism
that marked much of the work of the Burger Court, the current array
of Justices appointed by Presidents Ronald Reagan and George Bush
appears committed to the crafting of different goals and the effectua-
tion of an activist agenda for realizing them. Guidelines being devised
by the Court seem linked to a largely unavailing quest for "original
intent," an adjudicatory yardstick long thought to have been aban-
doned, and to projected movements intended to foster political con-
servatism. 2
The status of judicial federalism needs to be assessed within this
context of changing patterns. What initially began as occasional ven-
tures in state-oriented decision making became a serious alternative
stratagem that could not readily be dismissed over a period of two
decades. State constitutional law provides important options for advo-
* Professor of Political Science, Rutgers University; A.B., 1947, Brooklyn College;
A.M., 1948, Rutgers University; Ph.D., 1955, Columbia University.
1. United States v. Eichman, 110 S. Ct. 2404 (1990); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397
(1989).
2. The Rehnquist Court may best be known for its dramatically negative reformulation of
criminal law standards and for its recurring departures from established precedents. See Payne v.
Tennessee, 111 S. Ct. 2597 (1991) (doctrine of stare decisis does not require the Court to follow
precedent).
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cates bent on achieving victory in an era when many of the federal
courts no longer reflect the avant-garde views of the Warren years.
Indeed, any major judicial pronouncement in support of identifiably
liberal causes is likely to be found in the appellate courts of the states.
In 1986, the Supreme Court made known its aversion to an extension
of liberty interests beyond the boundaries of the constitutional text.3
Whether such a view may properly be regarded as a return to old-
fashioned restraint or to a recently embraced negative activism, the
"new" judicial federalism emerges as the most promising means of
promoting libertarian progress and innovation.
That state constitutions historically have offered feasible counter-
part choices within the framework of American federalism is undenia-
ble. 4 But the centripetal drift of power and functions during the
middle decades of the twentieth century militated against any realistic
reliance on states as effective sources of judicial inventiveness. With
the Great Depression and public receptiveness to rapidly expanding
federal authority, the states languished amidst proposals for a new-
found regionalism that, it was claimed, would better serve the na-
tional interest.' State courts were not considered dynamic or reliable
agencies of decisionmaking. 6 A reversal of outlook had to occur be-
fore judicial federalism would be able to assume its now familiar role,
offering not only practical alternative routes but also, at times, prefer-
ential adjudicatory instruments in the overall structural design.
If the years of World War II represented the nadir of state vigor
and prestige, what ensued in the aftermath of global conflict set the
stage for a major renaissance. Revulsion over the vast bureaucratic
morass that had been created by wartime mobilization was followed
by steps to revive the states as centers of accountability and participa-
tion. Yet, as the states began to take on a more vibrant identity, the
capacity and performance of outdated judicial systems failed to keep
pace with other aspects of internal upgrading. More auspiciously, a
number of states moved to revise obsolete constitutions. Some of the
constitutions, overburdened by excessive attention to minutiae, had
3. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (no fundamental right to engage in homosex-
ual sodomy).
4. For what appeared to be an incipient countertrend during the Warren Court era, see
Terrance Sandalow, Henry v. Mississippi and the Adequate State Ground: Proposals for a Re-
visedDoctrine, 1965 Sup. CT. Rsv. 187.
5. See Harold J. Laski, The Obsolescence of Federalism, THE NEw REPuBuic, at 367-69
(May 3, 1939). See also GEORgE C. S. BENSON, THE NEW CENTRALIZATION 58 (1941).
6. BENSON, supra note 5.
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resembled statute books rather than models reflecting the state's fun-
damental law. 7
Fears of possible state extinction, whether well-founded or fanciful,
supplied a compelling incentive for reform. The adoption of new con-
stitutions, whenever campaigns were successful, often gave rise to sig-
nificantly inventive devices.8 The admission of Hawaii and Alaska as
states served as an encouraging sign, nurturing support for statehood
and for the future of a Union in which the historic role of states, now
strengthened by redemptive efforts, was assured and substantial
growth was projected. 9
During the 1950s, judicial interpretations of state constitutions,
premised on time-honored principles of independent and adequate
state grounds, added little to foster the image of state autonomy in the
fashioning of safeguards apart from the national Constitution. Occa-
sionally, positive judgments derived from the wording of recently re-
vised state constitutions, but the results, translated into the idiom of
litigation, were not usually dramatic or extraordinary in their im-
pact.'0 The Supreme Court was often portrayed as a body possessed of
antistate predilections. Over the years, there had been exceptions as
evidenced when, in the late 1930s, the famous Erie" doctrine pro-
claimed an end to a much-berated federal common commercial law.
Federal courts in diversity proceedings were to act, in effect, as surro-
gates for state courts, following the state's decisional as well as statu-
tory law.
While the potential existed for a meaningful judicial federalism, its
realization remained beyond immediate attainment. The excesses of
the McCarthy period and their adverse effects upon freedom of ex-
pression and other libertarian guarantees were not often redressed by
state courts relying upon counterpart provisions of state constitutions.
Nor did state courts in the Old Confederacy exhibit exemplary behav-
ior in their efforts to thwart the effects of Brown v. Board of
Education2 and its progeny. The Supreme Court resorted to a draco-
7. Developments in the federal system are well chronicled and analyzed in WILLIAM B.
GRAVES, AMERICAN INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS: THEIR ORIGINS, HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT,
AND CURRENT STATUS (1964).
8. Id. at 153.
9. Id.
10. See Monrad 0. Paulsen, State Constitutions, State Courts and First Amendment Free-
doms, 4 VAND. L. REV. 620 (1951). State court guardianship of First Amendment freedoms was
said to be disappointing. Paulsen concluded: "If our liberties are not protected in Des Moines
the only hope is in Washington." Id. at 642.
11. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
12. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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nian ruling in Cooper v. Aaron3 to counter state schemes of "violent
resistance" to desegregation. State courts were not distinguished by
their responses during a period of crisis marked, in this instance, by
the deployment of federal troops to restore order when a federal
court's desegregation ruling was met by defiance and widespread resis-
tance.
An exception to the generally depressing conduct of the state courts
occurred in respect to efforts to link eligibility for federally aided
housing to positive declarations of loyalty. Several state courts re-
jected the attachment of such conditions as the "price" that citizens
might be compelled to pay before securing access to public benefits.' 4
The dangers of subversion, the judges averred, did not warrant the
level of compulsion and the sacrifice of rights required. In holding
unconstitutional a resolution of a local housing authority, the Su-
preme Court of Wisconsin found no "clear and present danger" to
societal interests when measured against the surrender of First
Amendment rights expected.' 6 Similarly, the Supreme Court of Illinois
set aside a comparable provision as violative of due process. 7 Despite
these positive efforts to rectify a doleful record during a stressful pe-
riod, the state courts generally acted by resorting to federal constitu-
tional safeguards.
Increasing, albeit infrequent, expressions of vitality by a scattering
of state judiciaries continued to appear during the 1960s. A noticeable
advance occurred in the area of legislative apportionment and redis-
tricting, which the Supreme Court had placed beyond the bounds of
judicial intervention by an expansion of the doctrine of political ques-
tions and by warnings about a "political thicket" that courts should
not enter. 8 The New Jersey Supreme Court had the temerity to spurn
such threats when in 1960 it ordered the State Legislature to undertake
congressional redistricting. 9 Admittedly, other state courts did not
pursue similar paths in this highly politicized zone and, following the
Supreme Court's landmark decision in Baker v. Carr,20 much of the
work of implementation fell to the federal courts. Nevertheless, the
possibility existed that a new surge of activism might be imparted to
13. 358 U.S. 1, 15 (1958).
14. Lawson v. Housing Auth., 70 N.W.2d 605 (Wis.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 882 (1955).
15. Id. at 615.
16. Id. at 614.
17. Chicago Housing Auth. v. Blackman, 122 N.E.2d 522 (Ill. 1954).
18. See Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 556 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., plurality opinion).
19. Asbury Park Press v. Woolley, 161 A.2d 705 (N.J. 1960).
20. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
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the state courts, which were thenceforth armed with Fourteenth
Amendment equal protection weaponry and a marked relaxation of
the impediments long posed by the doctrine of political questions. 2'
Completion of the "nationalization" of the Bill of Rights emerged
as one of the significant accomplishments of the Warren Court. No-
tions of "ordered liberty"' 2 and similar formulas were intended to es-
tablish an objective basis for the application or disavowal of specific
freedoms implicit in Fourteenth Amendment due process. A postwar
debate among the Justices over selective absorption versus outright in-
corporation of segments of the Bill of Rights resulted in inconclusive
findings.3 It was incorporation that ultimately came to prevail in one
of the major judicial reworkings of federal-state relations in the na-
tion's history. Law enforcement officials and state appellate judges
did not always look upon these developments with approval or admi-
ration. 24
With the culmination of the process effecting a nationalization of
the Bill of Rights, the enhancement of federal authority discouraged-
at least temporarily-any widespread resort to state declarations of
rights. Practitioners more often turned to the national Bill of Rights
whenever pertinent questions arose. A penchant for federal remedies
dominated the pleadings of advocates as well as the resulting opi-
nions, even when the case originated in the state courts. During the
Warren years, an activist Supreme Court appeared committed to the
expansion of national guarantees in an atmosphere reflective of
doubts about the state judiciaries' ability to pursue a vigorous and
effective decisional course premised solely on state constitutions. 25
All the same, nationalization, viewed in a different, more positive
light, might well have been looked upon as a stage preparatory to a
greater dependence upon state-derived guarantees. If the national
Constitution offered a fail-safe, baseline support mechanism that es-
21. Stanley H. Friedelbaum, Baker v. Carr: The New Doctrine of Judicial Intervention and
Its Implications for American Federalism, 29 U. Cm. L. REV. 673 (1962).
22. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
23. The polemical nature of the debate was evident in the fervent arguments advanced by
the principal protagonists, Justices Black and Frankfurter, in Adamson v. California, 332 U.S.
46 (1947). See also Felix Frankfurter, Memorandum on "Incorporation" of the Bill of Rights
into the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 78 HARv. L. REV. 746 (1965).
24. MELVI I. UROFSKY, THE CONTINUITY OF CHANGE: THE SUPREME COURT AND INDIVID-
UAL LIBERTIES, 1953-1986 162, 164-65 (1991); G. EDWARD WHITE, EARL WARREN: A PUBLIC LIFE
271, 277-78 (1982).
25. For useful counterbalancing arguments from a state perspective, see Hans A. Linde,
First Things First: Rediscovering the States' Bills of Rights, 9 U. BALT. L. REV. 379 (1980). An
earlier account appears in Vern Countryman, Why a State Bill of Rights?, 45 WASH. L. REV. 454
(1970).
1992] 1057
1058 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 19:1053
tablished an irreducible level of protection, what objection could there
be to state experimentation above this floor? Any dangers of retro-
gression or "backsliding" were mitigated by the bedrock of the Bill of
Rights, applied through the Fourteenth Amendment as the catalytic
agent, coupled with the abiding bulwark of the Supremacy Clause.
Thus, it could be argued, nationalization need never lead to the aban-
donment of state analogues. 6 Instead, the innovative language of the
state constitutions offered opportunities hitherto unforeseen in states
whose legacies as "laboratories" had long been noted, 27 but whose
potential had never been fully investigated. The ironic results of na-
tionalization merited additional inquiries in a multiform federal sys-
tem possessed of creative, albeit undeveloped, byways.28
The advent of the Burger Court brought with it a renewed emphasis
on state courts as significant agencies of conflict resolution and on
state constitutions as sources of doctrinal invention. Changing judicial
personnel, led by Chief Justice Burger, welcomed the revival of a
workable judicial federalism. Conservatives generally took the revival
to be a positive affirmation of political faith. Not to be outdone, the
Court's holdover liberal bloc considered judicial federalism a prag-
matically necessary recourse in a tribunal far less disposed to launch
new-found ventures than the Warren Court. 29
Why the state courts, in increasing numbers, began a concomitant
move in this unaccustomed direction remains problematic. Justice
Brennan, who became one of the principal proponents of state judi-
cial activism, admitted that it was not "easy to pinpoint why state
courts are beginning to emphasize the protections of their States' own
Bill of Rights.''30 He attributed it largely to the newly conservative
paths being followed by the Supreme Court, but the simplicity of a
mere reactive response is not persuasive. A drift toward activism was
already under way in a number of states. As the movement gathered
26. Stanley H. Friedelbaum, Independent State Grounds: Contemporary Invitations to Ju-
dicial Activism, in STATE SuPREME COURTS: POLICYMAICERS IN THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 23, 47-48
(Mary Porter & G. Alan Tarr eds., 1982).
27. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
28. Justice Brennan's steadfast encouragement of state-derived liberties included a call for a
"double source" of security. He cautioned that the "revitalization of state constitutional law is
no excuse for the weakening of federal protections and prohibitions." William J. Brennan, Jr.,
The Bill of Rights and the States: The Revival of State Constitutions as Guardians of Individual
Rights, 61 N.Y.U. L. REv. 535, 552 (1986).
29. When, in a Fourth Amendment case, the Supreme Court reversed a state court's "lib-
eral" findings, Justice Marshall, dissenting, reminded the state tribunal that it could reach "the
result it did under applicable state law." Texas v. White, 423 U.S. 67, 72 (1975).
30. William J. Brennan, Jr., Guardians of Our Liberties-State Courts No Less Than Fed-
eral, in ViEws FROM THE BENCH: THE JUDICIARY AND CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS 229, 232 (Mark
W. Cannon & David M. O'Brien eds., 1985).
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momentum, a bandwagon effect took hold and spurred other states to
join, especially when such trailblazers as California, New Jersey, New
York, Oregon, Hawaii, and Alaska led the way. 1
II. THE RENASCENT DECADES: A TRANSFORMATION IN PROGRESS
A. Public Education
A plethora of noteworthy state cases has marked the 1970s and suc-
ceeding decades. Significant points of origin are not readily discerni-
ble in a movement of such broad scope and geographic diversity, but
important beginnings lay in the area of educational financing and en-
titlements. Public education, traditionally a state responsibility with
guarantees incorporated explicitly in state constitutional provisions,
recurrently has come to the fore as a source of litigation. Yet, it must
be recalled, early efforts to redress claimed funding disparities were
not left exclusively to the states in an era still governed by a reliance
on the national Constitution as a primary source of relief. Highly divi-
sive questions of local financial support and its consequences came
before the Supreme Court in San Antonio School District v. Rodri-
guez.3 2 But a definitive resolution of the problem remained outside the
purview of the federal courts as a majority declined to proceed be-
yond previously established precedents and restraints.
Justice Powell, writing for the Court in Rodriguez, denied that the
challenges of Mexican-American parents of children in San Antonio's
Edgewood school district could be sustained under existing criteria. At
issue was the continuing validity of Texas' system of financing public
education, with its heavy reliance on local property taxation and its
allegedly negative impact on the impoverished. Justice Powell refused
to characterize wealth or its absence as a suspect classification subject
to strict scrutiny. Nor did he find convincing arguments that educa-
tion constituted a "fundamental interest" under equal protection
analysis.3 Instead, Justice Powell held that education did not enjoy
explicit protection under the Constitution. Standing alone, he main-
tained, it would not cause a departure from the usual standards of
review in economic and social regulatory cases.3 4 Conforming to such
31. An amendment to the California Constitution, adopted in 1974, declared that rights
guaranteed by the state charter were not "dependent" on those provided by the federal Consti-
tution. CAL. CONST., art. I, § 24. The Supreme Court of California made reference to its role as
a court of "last resort" in respect to the fundamental liberties of its citizens, subject only to the
proviso that it not restrict federal guarantees. People v. Longwill, 538 P.2d 753 (Cal. 1975).
32. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
33. Id. at 18.
34. Id.
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standards, the Court followed conventionally permissive guidelines,
adhering to the view that the Texas school finance plan was rationally
related to a legitimate state purpose.3 5
Often overlooked but more consequential than the central sections
of the opinion in Rodriguez was Justice Powell's recognition of an
ongoing national debate concerning questions of school finance. His
self-styled "cautionary postscript" warned that federal intervention
might cause an "upheaval" in public education while not helping the
poor and racial minorities, especially in core-city districts. 6 Justice
Powell added that the Court's action ought not to be viewed as "plac-
ing its judicial imprimatur" on the status quo. 37 He recognized the
need for reform in systems heavily dependent on local property taxes.
But, he counseled in closing, solutions had to be found in the demo-
cratic process. 38
Two years before the Supreme Court's ruling in Rodriguez, Califor-
nia's highest court had invalidated the state's school financing ar-
rangements in Serrano v. Priest.39 Subsequently, in light of the
negative response in Rodriguez, the California court went on to reaf-
firm its rationale with an altered basis for intervention premised on
state equal protection. Strict scrutiny criteria were reinstated with
guarantees linked to a method of analysis different from that required
by federal standards. 4° If Justice Powell's cautionary postscript had
not succeeded in encouraging reform by state legislators, it had served
as an invitation to renewed judicial intervention founded in state con-
stitutional formulas.
Similarly, the Supreme Court of New Jersey declared the state's sys-
tem of financing public education unconstitutional in Robinson v.
Cahill,41 the first version of which was decided in 1973. The mandate
for equal educational opportunity rested not in an equal protection
clause or its equivalent, but in an archaic section of the state constitu-
tion requiring support of a "thorough and efficient" system of public
schools .4 2
Succeeding school finance cases have been legion. The Supreme
Court of Connecticut found education to be a fundamental right, thus
departing substantially from the prevailing opinion in Rodriguez.43
35. Id. at 40-44.
36. Id. at 56.
37. Id. at 58.
38. Id. at 56-59.
39. 487 P.2d 1241 (Cal. 1971).
40. Serrano v. Priest, 557 P.2d 929 (Cal. 1977).
41. 303 A.2d 273 (N.J. 1973).
42. Id. at 285.
43. Horton v. Meskill, 376 A.2d 359 (Conn. 1977).
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More recently, the Supreme Court of Texas, in Edgewood Independ-
ent School District v. Kirby," invalidated the controversial system of
financing public schools sustained earlier in Rodriguez. It did so on
state constitutional grounds based upon the failure of the system to
meet a prescribed "efficiency" standard for the schools-one avowed
to be "essential" for a "general diffusion of knowledge." 45 The court
said that linkage existed between efficiency and equality, with districts
required to have "substantially equal access to similar revenues per
pupil at similar levels of tax effort." Building on Robinson v. Cahill
and its progeny, the Supreme Court of New Jersey returned to the
consideration of school financing themes in Abbott v. Burke,47 requir-
ing an equalization of per pupil expenditures between the impecunious
urban districts and the "affluent" suburbs, but without the confron-
tational politics evidenced two decades earlier. Both in Texas and in
New Jersey, the processes of implementation remained clouded in
contention. Prolonged and often inconclusive exchanges threatened to
upset fragile political balances and, in some respects, to unsettle the
stability of existing fiscal arrangements and revenue sources affecting
the state's economy.
B. Privacy
While educational issues have displayed an historic linkage to the
states, a right to privacy, though not as securely rooted, exhibits many
of the same characteristics derived from recently adopted state consti-
tutional provisions and amendments. Supreme Court decisions related
to privacy have generally been restricted to specific categories touch-
ing upon such matters as procreation, marriage, and family living. A
series of cases48 attest to federal protection of rights of intimate associ-
ation affecting heterosexual relations and are predicated on a limited
recourse to an updated version of substantive due process. Whether
such precedents will survive without modification is doubtful in view
of the Court's changing personnel and expressed attitudes. The deci-
sion in Bowers v. Hardwick49 casts serious doubt on any expansion of
concepts of personal autonomy in light of a majority's distaste for
"judge-made" constitutional standards. These standards make the
44. 777 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. 1989).
45. Id. at 394.
46. Id. at 397.
47. 575 A.2d 359, 364 (N.J. 1990).
48. See, e.g., such leading Burger Court cases as Carey v. Population Serv. Int'l., 431 U.S.
678 (1977); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
49. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
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Court "most vulnerable and [come] nearest to illegitimacy. "50 With
the exception of the Cruzan right-to-die case5 that the Court unex-
pectedly agreed to review-and that added little of substance to the
prevailing body of applicable law-the future of privacy rights and
their further articulation seems to rest largely in the states.
A number of state constitutions, especially those recently adopted
or amended, contain specific privacy provisions that extend guaran-
tees beyond Fourteenth Amendment due process. The wording se-
lected, in part, is reminiscent of the Declaration of Independence and
references to "inalienable rights." 5 2 For example, Florida's defense of
privacy interests centers about each person's "right to be let alone and
free from governmental intrusion into his private life." 53 In this con-
text, state courts have construed the constitutional text apart from or
in addition to what might be deduced from federal decisions. The lat-
ter are generally fragmentary and not often as promising as state pre-
cedents. This need not always be so in view of the breadth of the
liberty segment of the due process clause and the opportunities for
growth that it offers inventive jurists. But, if the Rehnquist Court ma-
jority's views can be accepted as indicative of future developments,
little can be expected beyond what has been previously set forth in the
decisional law.5 4 In fact, current precedents may be eroded, if not
wholly overturned 5
If federal notions of privacy exhibit few signs of sustained growth,
contention continues to revolve about established doctrines and their
prospects in a Court increasingly hostile to the development and main-
tenance of judicially-created rights. Two recent Supreme Court nomi-
nees became embroiled in disputes over the protective framework that
traditionally safeguards individuals from deprivations of liberty with-
out due process of law.16 In particular, the battle has centered around
the right to abortion and the measure of constitutional security that
attaches in light of persistent attacks barely stopping short of a direct
assault on the right itself.5 7 The Senate's advise and consent role, espe-
50. Id. at 194.
51. Cruzan v. Missouri Dep't of Health, I10 S. Ct. 2841 (1990).
52. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 1.
53. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 23.
54. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
55. Justice Stevens, dissenting in Payne v. Tennessee, III S. Ct. 2597, 2625 (1991), referred
to the "trivialization" of the doctrine of stare decisis in the Rehnquist Court.
56. The nominees were Judges Robert Bork and Clarence Thomas. For a contemporary
journalistic account and analysis, see Anthony Lewis, Lessons of Thomas, N.Y. TImss, Sept. 30,
1991, at A17.
57. See, e.g., Rust v. Sullivan, 111 S. Ct. 1759 (1991); Ohio v. Akron Ctr. for Reproductive
Health, I10 S. Ct. 2972 (1990); Hodgson v. Minnesota, l10 S. Ct. 2926 (1990); Webster v. Re-
productive Health Serv., 492 U.S. 490 (1989).
JUDICIAL FEDERALISM
cially in the confirmation hearings, has served as a maelstrom of op-
posing viewpoints and queries enmeshed not only in partisanship, but
also in a national debate so intense that it often defies accepted politi-
cal guidelines and loyalties. Because of a divisive and emotional rec-
ord on both sides, there has been a greater reliance on the state courts
as fora to preserve what growing numbers of advocates perceive as
impending repudiations in the federal courts of rights formerly sancti-
fied by expansive readings of the Constitution. 8
Many of the early privacy cases in the state courts focused upon
rights of bodily integrity when physicians and other health-care provi-
ders sought to compel procedures contrary to the wishes of afflicted
persons. Central to judicial decision making in this sphere of privacy
is a common law right of medical self-determination that makes the
patient the final and definitive source in the resolution of questions
related to the patient's well-being or, in some instances, to the pa-
tient's survival. A New Jersey case, In re Quinlan,9 established the
basis for subsequent decisions, but it did not affirm any right to die.
The decision to terminate life support fell to the father, acting on be-
half of his daughter. Additionally, the decision was predicated on her
persistent vegetative state, the medical prognosis of an irreversible
condition with no realistic hope of recovery, and agreement by a hos-
pital ethics committee that the outlook was hopeless for the patient's
return to a cognitive existence. The relief granted was based on fed-
eral, not state, constitutional grounds °
There followed a succession of cases raising comparable questions
in different contextual settings. One of the most noted of the post-
Quinlan series was Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Sai-
kewicz,6' involving an elderly, retarded person suffering from leuke-
mia. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, construing rights
of privacy and of informed consent, opted for the nonadministration
of chemotherapy because the issue was "not whether, but when, for
how long, and at what cost to the individual" life might be fleetingly
prolonged.6 2 In so ruling, the court held that incompetent persons pos-
sess the same rights as those extended to competent individuals. The
patient's assumed "judgment" was that the withholding of treatment
represented what the patient's views would have been in the circum-
stances.
58. Lewis, supra note 56.
59. 355 A.2d 647 (N.J.), cert. deniedsub nom. Garger v. New Jersey, 429 U.S. 922 (1976).
60. Id. at 662-64.
61. 370 N.E.2d 417 (Mass. 1977).
62. Id. at 426.
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To the contrary, New York's highest court rejected the line of rea-
soning pursued in Saikewicz when, in In re Storar,63 it declined to au-
thorize nonadministration of remedial medical procedures and
techniques to a middle-aged, severely retarded patient suffering from
bladder cancer. An age difference existed, but it is not clear that the
New York court found this to be a critical factor in the decision
reached. The court noted that, because of the individual's long-term
incompetency, it was improper to attempt a determination whether,
had he been competent, he would have elected to discontinue poten-
tially life-extending treatment. Because the measures required could be
undertaken without causing excessive pain, the court reasoned, it was
inappropriate to allow a person to die because a close relative consid-
ered it a preferable course for one whose malady was incurable. 4
The New Jersey Supreme Court subsequently stressed a common
law right to self-determination and adherence to the doctrine of in-
formed consent. Competency in making a rational and considered
choice loomed as the most significant factor in right-to-die cases as
the court took as its guiding principle that "competent persons gener-
ally are permitted to refuse medical treatment, even at the risk of
death." 65 Subsequent New Jersey decisions used a sliding scale de-
pendent upon the circumstances presented, the age of the patient, and
life expectancies. Three 1987 decisions6 emphasized elements of flexi-
bility, but determining patient intent and applying the doctrine of sub-
stituted judgment in specific circumstances remained open to varying
levels and modes of interpretation.
The cases noted were cited and considered by the Supreme Court in
Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health, 7 Missouri's
right-to-die case. Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Rehnquist re-
viewed at some length these state cases as important sources for doc-
trinal analysis and projection. He acknowledged the advantages and
even the primacy of the state courts as expositors in this perplexing
field, beset by formidable moral and ethical choices. He observed that
state courts could draw upon state constitutions, statutes, and com-
mon law-sources not generally available to the Supreme Court."
What Chief Justice Rehnquist did concede, in explicit terms, was that
a protected liberty interest to refuse unwanted medical treatment
63. 420 N.E.2d 64 (N.Y.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 858 (1981).
64. Id. at 73.
65. In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1225 (N.J. 1985).
66. In re FarreIl, 529 A.2d 404 (N.J. 1987); In re Peter, 529 A.2d 419 (N.J. 1987); In re
Jobes, 529 A.2d 434 (N.J. 1987).
67. 110S. Ct. 2841 (1990).
68. Id. at 2847.
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could be extracted from earlier decisions.69 As Justice O'Connor
stated in a concurring opinion, because of inextricable links between
physical freedom and self-determination, state incursions into the
body have been held to be repugnant to due process liberty. Such in-
terests, she concluded, should be entrusted to the "laboratory" of the
states to which the "more challenging task of crafting appropriate
procedures" for safeguarding them should be assigned.70
Inquiries concerning the nature of bodily integrity extended to abor-
tion decisions involving, as they ineluctably did, the fate of the devel-
oping fetus. In some instances, the state courts were willing to move
beyond the bounds of Roe v. Wade7' in providing assistance to indi-
gent women where federal aid proved to be unavailable. When Con-
gress substantially reduced support for state programs funding
abortions for those in need, the Supreme Court refused to offer any
remedial relief. A woman's fundamental right to an abortion re-
mained undisturbed, the Court made clear in Harris v. McRae7 2 but
the means of realization in many cases were unavailing. Therein lay
the role of the states if, in fact, the financial gap created was to be
filled.
A reliance on the state counterpart of due process prompted the
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts to require provision for
abortion as one of the options available to women in weighing their
reproductive alternatives. If the Legislature offered public funds for
those carrying fetuses to full term, the court declared in Moe v. Secre-
tary of Administration,73 it was obligated to grant like benefits to
women aborting. Once the decision was made to subsidize childbear-
ing or health care generally, due process required that there be "genu-
ine indifference" in providing accessibility to the necessary
resources. 74 To do otherwise, the majority argued, would be discrimi-
natory.75 Nor did the preservation of life, an acknowledged state inter-
est, serve to outweigh the significance of the individual rights at stake.
The Supreme Court of California, in Committee to Defend Repro-
ductive Rights v. Myers, 6 arrived at a similar conclusion, but it
achieved the result by way of a different predicate. A right of privacy
emerged, linked to a concept of procreative choice that forbade any
69. Id. at 2852.
70. Id. at 2859.
71. 410U.S. 113 (1973).
72. 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
73. 417 N.E.2d 387 (Mass. 1981).
74. Id. at 389.
75. Id. at 402.
76. 625 P.2d 779 (Cal. 1981).
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legislative proscription of funding for elective abortions. The receipt
of state benefits could not be conditioned on a woman's compelled
disavowal of a constitutionally guaranteed right. Despite discord on
the court, the majority prevailed in preserving women's rights by what
a dissent termed "semantic legerdemain. ' 7
During the beginnings of the Rehnquist Court, abortion rights have
continued to be eroded at the periphery. The potential exists, how-
ever, for state courts to "recapture" what has been lost in the federal
Supreme Court. The continued survival of Roe, enfeebled though it
may be, makes ultimate, pivotal choices unnecessary at this time. But
noncore elements are ripe for judicial determination as challenges
multiply and emotional issues grow more fervent.
Decisions affecting procreative choice, though intimately linked to
the highly charged issue of abortion, have exhibited significant ramifi-
cations in other areas as well. The origins of the abortion controversy
are rooted in the nineteenth century, when such concepts as the
"quickening" doctrine were instituted and later abandoned by state
courts as descriptive of the severity of the criminal penalty to be im-
posed. 78 Its consequences were expanded to encompass birth control
devices as these emerged early in the twentieth century.7 9 More closely
related to current scientific advances are questions of surrogate par-
enthood. Judicial inquiries have been slow to develop and to provide
acceptable legal and constitutional guidelines. Neither statutory nor
judicial remedies have kept pace with innovative techniques for non-
coital reproduction.
Perhaps the most publicized of the surrogate parenting cases arose
in New Jersey. The Baby MO0 case posed many of the questions that
affected the validity of surrogate contracts terminating the mother's
parental rights, the possible public policy conflicts posed in the cir-
cumstances, and the presumed rights advanced by the natural father.
Despite the biological mother's objections and her outward disavowal
of the contract subsequent to her original agreement to surrender the
child to the natural father and his wife, a lower court required specific
enforcement in the best interests of the child. The natural mother was
characterized in unusually derogatory terms while the biological father
and his wife were described as nearly impeccable parents.,
77. Id. at 807 (Richardson, J., dissenting).
78. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Taylor, 132 Mass. 261 (1882); Commonwealth v. Bangs, 9
Mass. 369 (1812).
79. A well-known challenge to an antidistribution statute occurred in People v. Sanger, 222
N.Y. 192 (1918).
80. In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988).
81. In re Baby M, 525 A.2d 1128 (N.J. Super. 1987), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 537 A.2d
1227 (N.J. 1988).
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New Jersey's highest court, in a sweeping reversal of the lower
court's findings, outlawed surrogate parenting contracts unless volun-
tarily entered into and executed by the natural mother.8 2 Notably miss-
ing was extensive attention to constitutional issues that were treated, if
at all, at the margin. Were there not state analogues comparable to
the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments? If so, why did one of
the nation's most activist courts evade such issues? Was there not in-
trinsic invalidity and a violation of basic human rights attaching to
any requirement, by contract or otherwise, that compelled a person to
perform service and to function, in effect, as a vessel or conduit to
"deliver" a human product that should be hers as a matter of per-
sonal autonomy? The New Jersey court touched upon these questions
fleetingly, but novel issues of servitude were avoided. Instead, the jus-
tices described a right of privacy as controlling, with references to the
"purchase of a woman's procreative capacity at the risk of her life"
and to surrogacy as a "matter so private, yet of such public inter-
est." 3
While the New Jersey court's resort to constitutional analysis was
unexpectedly limited, the Baby M precedent served to discourage fur-
ther growth of surrogate parenting as a viable alternative for infertile
couples. The likelihood that surrogate mothers would bear children
without recompense was improbable. To this extent, then, the judg-
ment discouraged and all but ended any further efforts to revive this
application of biotechnology. Yet the court's disinclination to grapple
fully with such novel offshoots of privacy made for uncertainty and a
doctrinal vacuum devoid of the innovative elements usually associated
with judicial agenda-setting and problem-solving. Although there was
no appreciable resort to state constitutional provisions in Baby M, an
appeal to the United States Supreme Court never appeared to be a
realistic choice or substitute for decision making in the state courts.
The Baby M decision, effectively invalidating surrogate parent-
hood, conveyed an ironic message with the award of custody of the
child to the natural father and the adoptive mother. The surrogate
mother's rights of visitation were preserved, but the New Jersey court
claimed that in making the award, it had acted in the "best interests"
of the child.84 Privacy interests were also implicated, but the court dis-
claimed the father's allegations of a constitutionally protected right of
82. 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988).
83. A review and preliminary analysis of the decision may be found in Surrogate Parenting:
Reflections on Public Policy, Constitutionality, and Related Interests, in STANLEY H. FRIEDEL-
BAUM, JuDIcIAL FEDERALISM AND RELATED DEVELOPMENTS: A DECADE OF CHANGE IN NEW JER-
SEY 59 (1990).
84. Baby M, 537 A.2d at 1256-64.
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procreative liberty."5 Almost a decade earlier, the same court in In re
Grady86 had examined "best interest" standards and procedures in as-
sessing the proposed exercise of parental surrogacy rights in behalf of
an incompetent young adult suffering from Down's Syndrome. Pri-
vacy interests once more were in evidence. In part, the determination
rested upon a reexamination of precedents drawn from Quinlan as
well as from adoption and child custody cases. 87
More rancorous than the novel issues considered in Baby M were
the emotionally charged questions posed in Grady. The parents of a
nineteen-year-old noninstitutionalized woman, afflicted with severe
mental retardation, had sought authorization to have their daughter
sterilized. Despite apparent parallels, the New Jersey court declined to
follow Quinlan unreservedly toward the resolution of what it de-
scribed as a "disturbing paradox.' '88 In effect, the court sought to rec-
oncile a personal right to prevent conception and the right to make a
meaningful and informed choice. Surprisingly, yet understandably on
closer examination, sterilization was taken to be a more controversial
remedy in the light of its history and other associated factors than was
the decision to terminate life in Quinlan.9
Promotion of compulsory eugenic sterilization stemmed, in large
measure, from the prevailing beliefs of the 1920s. Elimination of
those deemed "unfit" by reason of heredity was looked upon as a
social good to be fostered by the state. 90 A Supreme Court case, Buck
v. Bell,9' afforded legitimacy to the movement by sanctioning the ap-
plication of a state's compulsory sterilization law to a mentally im-
paired woman confined in a state hospital. In a much-decried opinion
of the Court, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes recited the prevailing
dogma in exceptionally strong terms. He declared that a feeble-
minded inmate of a state institution might be sterilized without violat-
ing due process or equal protection to prevent society's "being
swamped with incompetence. ' 92 Holmes concluded starkly that
"[t]hree generations of imbeciles are enough." 93
In light of the events of the 1930s (including countless atrocities and
systematic genocide abroad), the Court revised its treatment of sterili-
85. Id. at 1253-55.
86. 426 A.2d 467 (N.J. 1981).
87. Id. at 473-76.
88. Id. at 469.
89. Id. at 472-73.
90. Note, Eugenic Sterilization-A Scientific Analysis, 46 DENV. L.J. 631, 632-34 (1969).
91. 274U.S. 200 (1927).
92. Id. at 207.
93. Id.
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zation. 94 It was in this context that the New Jersey court in Grady
proceeded with care and some measure of trepidation in exploring the
available options. The act of sterilization contemplated by the young
woman's parents was characterized as neither voluntary nor compul-
sory. Even if, as the court conceded, the right to be sterilized fell
within the ambit of privacy rights protected against undue interference
by the state constitution, the complementary right to procreate called
for rigorous inquiry. 95 Consequently, the court departed from the
Quinlan test in requiring close judicial supervision in the best interests
of mentally incompetent persons to ensure that past abuses do not
recur. A final determination was said to rest with a chancery court in
the exercise of its parens patriae power to safeguard those unable to
protect themselves because of an innate legal disability. 96 A list of per-
suasive factors was stipulated, with the controlling criterion being
"clear and convincing" proof that the incompetent person's best in-
terests will be served by sterilization. 97
Apart from procreative and contraceptive choices, state courts have
considered ancillary aspects not only of the reproductive act but also
of sexual relations and preferences in a variety of settings. Antiquated
fornication statutes have been held unconstitutional as deprivations of
privacy rights under state constitutions. 98 Moreover, several state
courts have critically examined antisodomy statutes within a similar
privacy context.99 But, in one of the most imaginative of these cases,
the state court based its findings on federal rather than state constitu-
tional grounds.
The decision in People v. Onofre,100 decided by New York's Court
of Appeals, resulted in the invalidation of an antisodomy statute that
had outlawed deviate sexual behavior and subjected it to the penalties
of the criminal law. What emerged was a reworking of federal prece-
dents toward the achievement of the desired end. Echoes of substan-
tive due process reappeared by way of references to a "penumbral"
right of privacy' 0 linked to what the state court took to be the outer
94. See the application of a "fundamental rights" philosophy to marriage and procreation
in Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942). A retrospective critique of Buck v. Bell appears in
Walter Berns, Buck v. Bell: Due Process of Law?, 6 W. POL. Q. 764 (1953).
95. 426 A.2d 467, 474-75.
96. Id. at 479-81.
97. Id. at 483.
98. See, e.g., State v. Saunders, 381 A.2d 333 (N.J. 1977).
99. See, e.g., People v. Onofre, 415 N.E.2d 936 (N.Y. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 987
(1981).
100. Id.
101. See generally Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
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limits of privacy interests. 2 Why the court elected to act on federal
constitutional grounds when state due process was available as an al-
ternative recourse is unclear. Yet the positive outcome that resulted
served as a reminder that a reliance on state constitutional provisions
is not always the only road to innovative ends. The vagaries of federal
constitutional explication, skillfully construed and, where necessary,
artfully redesigned, offer opportunities for growth and creativity that
should not be overlooked by state courts in their search for inventive
techniques.
To like effect, the New Jersey Supreme Court, in In re T.L.O.,1
applied federal Fourth Amendment guidelines to student searches un-
dertaken by public school administrators. State constitutional ana-
logues might readily have been invoked if the justices had intended to
immunize the decision-involving suppression of the evidence in a
drug-related case-from federal review. The Supreme Court inter-
vened and reversed the state court's judgment, despite reliance on sim-
ilar reasoning.' °4
The California Supreme Court also invited federal review and rever-
sal in the controversial Bakke'05 "benign" discrimination case. Just as
no compelling reason existed to rely on federal constitutional law in
the New Jersey case, the California court did not have to select the
Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection clause as the fulcrum on
which its findings turned. It is evident that the course followed in
Bakke was purposeful-to prepare the way, if not to ensure, final dis-
position of the issues in the Supreme Court. That federal intercession
resulted in a disturbingly ambivalent opinion'0° does not obviate the
intent of the prevailing state majority. The question of racial quotas,
fraught with emotional as well as highly charged political overtones,
apparently proved persuasive in this instance. It appears that an activ-
ist state court need not uniformly decide controversial cases on state
constitutional grounds if, either on the basis of public policy consider-
ations or political pragmatism, there is resolve to shunt the final adju-
dication to the nation's highest court.
C. Age Discrimination
Lest it be assumed that the privacy cases presaged an unrelenting
stream of decisions extending constitutional recognition and protec-
102. 415 N.E.2d at 942.
103. 463 A.2d 934 (N.J. 1983), rev'd sub nom. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1988).
104. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
105. Bakke v. Regents of the Univ. of California, 553 P.2d 1152 (Cal. 1976), aff'd in part,
rev'd in part, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). Cf. DeRonde v. Regents of the Univ. of California, 625 P.2d
220 (Cal. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 832 (1981) (equal protection imposes bar against affirma-
tive action).
106. Regents of the Univ. of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
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tion to persons vulnerable to discrimination by reason of physical or
innate characteristics (as in racial and sexual cases), factors associated
with age have never attained the status of fundamental rights or sus-
pect classifications in federal constitutional law. The requirement of
mandatory retirement at age seventy, particularly as it relates to state
judges, has raised questions tied to equal protection and due process
guarantees. The standard of review applied in Supreme Court cases
has remained a rational relationship test. 10 7 An act will not be invali-
dated if "any state of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify
it."' 18 Those of advancing age do not constitute a suspect class; nor is
the right to public employment a fundamental interest. °9
Federal courts tend to defer to state discretion in the administration
of governmental services, including determination of the most able or
qualified employees and those who best reflect contemporary view-
points and the present societal makeup. 10 All the same, current devel-
opments militate in favor of eliminating mandatory retirement based
only on age. If judges are singled out for compulsory retirement at
age seventy while other public officials are permitted to continue re-
gardless of age, it is at least arguable that the constitutional guarantee
of equal protection has been violated."'
State cases have offered little, if any, evidence of greater protection,
beyond the narrow holdings of the United States Supreme Court, with
respect to age discrimination. The Supreme Court of Hawaii, long
considered one of the most "progressive" of state tribunals, followed
conventional patterns of decision making in Daoang v. Department of
Education."2 When a state employee took exception to mandatory re-
tirement, it sustained the law against equal protection challenges."'
The court found no infringement upon a claimed, but disavowed, fun-
damental right to work, and it pursued a rational basis test as the
appropriate standard of review. It declined to undertake a rigorous
examination of the state's objectives, holding instead that a reasona-
ble basis existed for the assumption that physical and intellectual skills
may suffer impairment because of advancing years." 4
107. Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93 (1979); Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427
U.S. 307 (1976).
108. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 426 (1961).
109. JOHN E. NowAK, ET AL., CONSTUTiONAL LAw § 14.3 (3d ed. 1986).
110. EEOC v. Massachusetts, 858 F.2d 52 (Ist Cir. 1988).
111. See Sabo v. Casey, 757 F. Supp. 587 (E.D. Pa. 1991) (section of the Pennsylvania Con-
stitution as applied to judges more than 70 years old held to be unconstitutional).
112. 630P.2d629(Haw. 1981).
113. Id. at 633. The case arose before Congress' enactment of amendments to the Age Dis-
crimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-631, and its extension to persons over age 40
and to public employees (except for stipulated categories).
114. Id. at 631-32.
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A Supreme Court inquiry into mandatory retirement for state
judges resulted in a renewed finding that, in constitutional terms, the
requirement did not violate the equal protection clause." 5 Admittedly,
the focus involved application of the federal Age Discrimination in
Employment Act to exclusionary definitions of employees, whether
elected or high-ranking, including those appointed to policymaking
positions. Apart from an examination of statutory requirements, how-
ever, there was no inclination to modify any assessment beyond the
rational basis level.
That challenges premised on charges of age discrimination will not
be perceptibly advanced by filings in state courts emerged from the
California Supreme Court's ruling in Schmidt v. Superior Court,"6
decided in 1989 by one of the nation's leading appellate courts. A
state civil code provision had facilitated a mobile home park's imposi-
tion of a regulation limiting residency to persons aged twenty-five or
older. The purpose was clear: to minimize security and other operat-
ing costs by restricting eligibility to mature residents who allegedly
presented fewer problems. The court sanctioned no more than a ra-
tional basis test because age was said not to rise to the level of classifi-
cations linked to race or ethnicity. 1 7 Given the minimal scrutiny, the
policy adopted was deemed neither arbitrary nor irrational.
In regard to gender-based discrimination, state equal rights amend-
ments have encouraged and actually given rise to a broad range of
challenges linked to a strict scrutiny test of sexual classifications. Yet
the outcomes have not always proved as rewarding as advocates had
predicted. 18 What has occurred is a blurring of lines of distinction
between the sexes with respect to aspects of the marital relationship," 9
the unisex treatment of and eligibility for alimony payments,' 20 and
the abolition of interspousal immunity.12' New rules have set aside ca-
nards describing the "proper" role of the sexes and perpetuating ster-
eotypes tied to Blackstonian definitions of marital unity.
115. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 111 S. Ct. 2395 (1991).
116. 769 P.2d 932 (Cal. 1989).
117. Id. at 944-45.
118. G. Alan Tarr & Mary Cornelia Porter, Gender Equality and Judicial Federalism: The
Role of State Appellate Courts, 9 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 919 (1982).
119. See, e.g., Phelps v. Bing, 316 N.E.2d 775 (Ill. 1974) (the elimination of differential age
requirements for marriage licenses in Illinois).
120. See Henderson v. Henderson, 327 A.2d 60, 62 (Pa. 1974); Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 281
(1979).
121. Merenoff v. Merenoff, 388 A.2d 951 (N.J. 1978); Lewis v. Lewis, 351 N.E.2d 526
(Mass. 1976); Brooks v. Robinson, 284 N.E.2d 794 (Ind. 1972).
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Gender-related distinctions continue although, because of the adop-
tion of state equal rights amendments, strict scrutiny has become
more common as the accepted standard. The Supreme Court has de-
clined to proceed beyond an intermediate scrutiny level that is less per-
missive than a rational basis test but not as compelling as a strict
scrutiny test. 2 2 Thus sex discrimination has been subjected to a more
searching constitutional examination than age-based bias. In practice,
the principal remedies for gender and age discrimination continue to
lie in statutory prescriptions, whether pursued in federal or state
courts. 113
D. First Amendment
The course of expressive liberties and resorts to state versions of the
First Amendment's religion clauses have not been appreciably affected
by recent revivals of state constitutional law. During the early decades
of the nation's history, the state courts played a more critical role
when, with the Bill of Rights inapplicable to state proceedings, state
constitutional provisions were more often relied upon as primary
sources. The abolition of established churches in several states oc-
curred in the 1830s and 1840s.12 4 Thereafter, particularly after the
First Amendment was "absorbed" in the middle years of the twenti-
eth century, state courts were prone to follow federal rulings as adju-
dicatory models. To this point, a reinvigorated judicial federalism has
not given rise to notably innovative departures, though the potential
for growth remains and one day may reach fulfillment.'2
Exceptions, where they have come to pass, have resulted largely
from clearcut linguistic differences between federal and state clauses.
122. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (gender-based classifications must be substantially
related to achievement of important government objectives) remains controlling. See also Missis-
sippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982) (policy of state-supported university of
denying males the right to enroll in its nursing school violates equal protection); Rostker v.
Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981) (selective service registration of only men does not violate due
process); Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464 (1981) (California statutory rape law un-
der which only men could be held criminally liable does not unlawfully discriminate on the basis
of gender.).
123. A "benign" use of gender-related classifications, linked to permissible affirmative ac-
tion programs grounded on statutory premises, was sustained in Johnson v. Transportation
Agency, 480 U.S. 616 (1987).
124. A state-by-state review is provided in ARTrm E. SuTrm.AND, CONSTTrrTONAnLSM IN
AMERICA: ORiGIN AND EVOLUTION OF rrs FUNDmENrA IDEAS 267, 274, 277, 286, 296 (1965).
125. See G. Alan Tarr, State Constitutionalism and "First Amendment" Rights, in HUM
Rioirrs IN THE SrATES: NEW DiRacnoNs IN CoNsTImTToNAL POLIcYmAxING 21 (Stanley H. Frie-
delbaum ed., 1988) [hereinafter HUMAN Rimss].
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A textbook loan program, consistent with federal religion clause stan-
dards, was set aside by the Nebraska Supreme Court when weighed
against provisions of the state constitution. 26 At the same time, the
results more often have proved to be inconclusive, if not ambivalent
in their impact. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts as-
sumed an unyielding position of negation in applying an "anti-aid"
amendment to public monies assigned to nonpublic schools.127 By con-
trast, a Missouri state court sustained payments of tuition grants to
students at public and private colleges despite a state constitutional
prohibition more restrictive than First Amendment counterpart provi-
sions. 28 Nonetheless, the same court struck down as unconstitutional
state efforts to use federal funds to provide instruction for elementary
and secondary students in sectarian schools. 29
The proclivity of state courts to draw upon federal precedents,
though not always with like results, was strikingly evident in the Sun-
day closing law cases. Since the Supreme Court's invention of a "fam-
ily togetherness" motif in a series of 1961 decisions sustaining Sunday
closing against establishment and free exercise challenges,"10 the state
courts have been faced with comparable claims, though they have
been aimed at achieving more varied ends. Courts in New York and
Pennsylvania premised findings of unconstitutionality on narrowly
disguised concepts of equal protection tied largely to a galaxy of ex-
ceptions in the prevailing statutes. The validity of notions of a uni-
form day of rest emerged virtually unscathed.' In New Jersey, the
electorate was left with the ultimate decision in county-by-county ref-
erenda when the state's usually activist supreme court, for unex-
plained reasons, uncharacteristically deferred to legislative
prerogatives and embraced federally devised standards.1 2
E. Criminal Law
Just as the state courts have largely followed guidelines established
by the Supreme Court regarding expressive liberties and the religion
126. Gaffney v. State Dep't of Educ., 220 N.W.2d 550 (Neb. 1974).
127. Bloom v. School Comm., 379 N.E.2d 578 (Mass. 1978).
128. Americans United v. Rogers, 538 S.W.2d 711 (Mo.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1029 (1976).
129. Mallory v. Barrera, 544 S.W.2d 556 (Mo. 1976).
130. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961); Two Guys From Harrison-Allentown,
Inc. v. McGinley, 366 U.S. 582 (1961); Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961); Gallagher v.
Crown Kosher Super Market, 366 U.S. 617 (1961).
131. Kroger Co. v. O'Hara Township, 392 A.2d 266 (Pa. 1978); People v. Abrahams, 353
N.E.2d 574 (N.Y. 1976).
132. Vornado Inc. v. Hyland, 390 A.2d 606 (N.J. 1978).
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clauses, similar patterns prevail in criminal law.' It needs to be re-
called that state judges often have had first-hand contacts with the
criminal justice system either as prosecutors or as lower court person-
nel; 34 that a majority of the cases that fill the dockets of state courts
arise from the appeals of felons convicted of crimes of violence or of
other types of reprehensible behavior;"' that the state courts are af-
fected by a proximity to and a familiarity with the problems faced by
law enforcement officers-problems that dim in a tribunal as remote
as the Supreme Court; and that traditionally the development of the
criminal law, both in its statutory format and content and its prece-
dential output, has been committed substantially and, for much of the
nation's history, almost exclusively to the primacy of the states.
Departures from federal standards of the post-Warren Court years,
when they occurred in the 1970s and 1980s, were still considered ex-
ceptional and essentially aberrational. For the most part, differences
revolved around protections intended to narrow "unreasonable"
searches and seizures and to defend rights against self-incrimination.
Several newly activist state courts may have taken as their lodestars
Justice Hugo Black's advice that a state has power to "impose higher
standards on searches and seizures than required by the Federal Con-
stitution if it chooses to do sO. ' m136 Yet there were relatively few fed-
eral cases that prompted a resort to independent state grounds. The
so-called Robinson-GustafsonM rule, justifying authority for a search
on a custodial arrest, ranked high among the Supreme Court decisions
that gave rise to contrary judicial intervention in a number of states.'
Similarly, the Supreme Court's depreciation of the controversial ex-
clusionary rule in Harris v. New York'39 led several state courts to
take exception to what was considered a marked infringement of the
rights of the accused. 40 The Court's dramatic action in a 1984 case,
133. A recent commentator reports that "two-thirds of the criminal rulings are endorse-
ments, not repudiations" of Supreme Court decisions and that many "vanguard" state courts
have "very high rates of approval of the output of the Burger/Rehnquist majority." Barry
Latzer, The Hidden Conservatism of the State Court "Revolution," 74 JUDICATURE 190, 190-91
(1991).
134. Id.
135. Id. at 191.
136. Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 62 (1967).
137. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973); Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260
(1973).
138. Zehrung v. State, 569 P.2d 189 (Alaska 1977); People v. Brisendine, 531 P.2d 1099
(Cal. 1975); State v. Kaluna, 520 P.2d 51 (Haw. 1974).
139. 401 U.S. 222 (1971).
140. See People v. Disbrow, 545 P.2d 272 (Cal. 1976); State v. Santiago, 492 P.2d 657 (Haw.
1971).
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United States v. Leon,' 41 effected a modification of the exclusionary
rule by introducing a good-faith exception. After Leon, evidence
seized pursuant to an invalid warrant did not have to be excluded if
the police could demonstrate a good faith reliance on the defective
warrant. The New Jersey Supreme Court assumed a position of lead-
ership in the criminal justice area when, three years later, it rejected
the good-faith exception by reference to an ill-defined "historical per-
spective" that had the exclusionary rule "imbedded in our jurispru-
dence." 142
A more portentous source of conflict lay in continuing debates over
capital punishment. From the early 1970s, when the Supreme Court of
California found the death penalty violative of the state constitution's
"cruel or unusual punishments" provision, 143 to recent differences
over similar issues, the questions raised have interjected a political
component not often found in the wake of judicial decisions. The Cal-
ifornia case brought the court into conflict with the state's attorney
general and resulted in its subsequent reversal by referendum. 144 Re-
current conflicts with the electorate over capital punishment, in part,
led to a marked change in judicial personnel and the end of the Bird
Court in 1986.14
Latent forces at work in otherwise activist state judiciaries may be-
come more spirited in the criminal law area as a result of the Rehnqu-
ist Court's recent rulings. Indeed, the 1990-1991 term of the Supreme
Court revealed a more decided anti-defendant animus than any that
had manifested itself during the Burger years. A majority seemed de-
termined to undo what some had viewed as the "revolution" initiated
in the course of the Warren Court's nationalization of the Bill of
Rights. 146 What was most disturbing and what may provoke more
lively state intervention were the precedents that were overturned, sev-
eral of recent origin. 47 The notion that state courts follow the Su-
141. 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
142. State v. Novembrino, 519 A.2d 820, 850-51 (N.J. 1987).
143. People v. Anderson, 493 P.2d 880 (Cal.), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 958 (1972).
144. An account of developments in California appears in Jerome B. Falk, Jr., The Supreme
Court of California, 1971-1972, Forward: The State Constitution: A More Than "Adequate"
Nonfederal Ground, 61 CAL. L. REv. 274, 274-77 (1973).
145. Chief Justice Rose Bird was removed by the electorate in 1986.
146. A balanced appraisal appears in Yale Kamisar, The Warren Court (Was It Really So
Defense-Minded?), The Burger Court (Is It Really So Prosecution-Oriented?), and Police Inves-
tigatory Practices, in THE BURGER CoURT: THE COUmTER-EVOLUnMN THAT WASN'T 72 (Steven
Blasi, ed., 1983).
147. With respect to automobile searches, for example, the Court, in California v. Acevedo,
111 S. Ct. 1982 (1991), overruled a 1979 precedent, Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 (1979).
Cf. Florida v. Jimeno, 111 S. Ct. 1801 (1991) (Fourth Amendment not violated when a police
officer who has permission to search a car opens a closed container that might reasonably con-
tain the object of the search).
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preme Court in most aspects of the criminal law no longer may be
valid should current indicators continue to unfold and intensify.
F. Substantive Due Process
Avid attention to the protection and advancement of liberty inter-
ests, intended to safeguard a right of privacy, has often tended to ob-
scure liberty in its more inclusive and historic sense. When property
rights are commingled with liberty interests by way of Fourteenth
Amendment due process, memories of a troubled era in the Supreme
Court's history recur. Events of this period recall national trauma,
having prompted serious attacks upon the Court's institutional integ-
rity and established practices of judicial review. Mention of such dis-
honored precedents as Lochner v. New York, 48 Coppage v. Kansas,149
and New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann'0 strikes a redolent note of sub-
stantive due process, suggestive of an unlamented past that vanished
following the great judicial debacle of 1937-1938. For several decades
thereafter, the Supreme Court moved resolutely to undo the negativ-
ism that had prevailed-embracing disavowals so emphatic that the
review function in economic and social regulatory cases declined to
the point of self-abnegation.'5 ' Legislative choices were recognized as
paramount, aggressive interventionism was eschewed as nefarious and
unconscionable, and a broad-based doctrine of deference controlled
as the prevailing standard.5 2
A halting return to substantive due process did not become noticea-
ble until the late 1960s when sporadic references to the much-berated
predicate were undertaken (seemingly when all else failed) to advance
such libertarian causes as personal autonomy.' All the same, state
safety measures continued to be accorded a broad degree of deference
unless incursions upon federally guaranteed rights reached egregious
levels. Restraints upon the police power of the states existed mini-
mally, if at all, in assessments of legislative judgments. 54 Supreme
148. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
149. 236 U.S. 1 (1915).
150. 285 U.S. 262 (1932).
151. A thoughtful account of the Court's redemptive quest and of its remarkable lengths
appears in Robert G. McCloskey, Economic Due Process and the Supreme Court: An Exhuma-
tion and Reburial, 1962 Sup. CT. REv. 34.
152. See, e.g., New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297 (1976); Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348
U.S. 483 (1955); Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
153. Richard A. Epstein, Substantive Due Process by Any Other Name: The Abortion
Cases, 1973 Sup. CT. REv. 159.
154. Stanley H. Friedelbaum, Reprise or Denouement: Deference and the New Dissonance in
the Burger Court, 26 EmoRY L.J. 337 (1977).
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Court opinions exhibited little concern that the state regulatory func-
tion, virtually unrestrained in an era marked by judicial indulgence
and abstention, might endanger "preferred" liberties. 5 No more
than a minimum rationality test was held to be acceptable, and any
negative recourse to it was reserved for exceptional occasions. Only
recently have there been indications of a credible effort to revive eco-
nomic liberties as essential and defensible protective shields in the con-
stitutional scheme.' 56 Similarly, an unremitting adherence to deference
as an article of judicial faith has declined somewhat in a Court that
has returned to some semblance of balance in its consideration of the
states' regulatory power.
What the Supreme Court acknowledged only reluctantly and epi-
sodically in regard to the review function never disappeared from the
judicial arsenal of the states.' 57 In most cases, deference served as the
dominant motif. But, in the absence of overt threats to institutional
stability, state courts never surrendered the right to inquire, whether
critically or not. It was still possible to charge violations of due proc-
ess with some anticipation of a favorable result, particularly when un-
savory lobbying activities could be cited and exposed to public view.
In sum, negative interventionism in the states was never abandoned to
the extent that it had become anathema among the post-1937 Supreme
Court's working options.
Although acclaimed as an activist-oriented tribunal, the New Jersey
Supreme Court reflects the inherent ambivalence discernible in the ec-
onomic regulatory area. A recent case, In re C. V.S. Pharmacy
Wayne, 8 raised issues of economic due process within the framework
of regional shopping malls and the competitive patterns common to
large chains of pharmacies. The state sought to prevent price wars to
ensure the survival of available pharmacies and to maintain prevailing
standards. To these ends, the statute in question prohibited premiums
or rebates related to drug sales except in regard to trading stamps or
discounts accorded persons sixty-two years of age or older. When
Consumer Value Stores (CVS) engaged in price cutting for prescrip-
tion drugs, the State Board of Pharmacy moved against a pharmacist
for engaging in "grossly unprofessional conduct."' 59 A fine imposed
155. United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
156. A cogent rationale is presented in BERNARD H. SiEoAN, ECONOMiC LIBERTIES AND THE
CONsTrruTiON (1980).
157. Classic accounts of earlier periods may be found in Monrad G. Paulsen, The Persist-
ence of Substantive Due Process in the States, 34 MINN. L. REv. 91 (1950) and in John A. C.
Hetherington, State Economic Regulation and Substantive Due Process of Law, 53 Nw. U. L.
REv. 226 (1958).
158. 561 A.2d 1160 (N.J. 1989).
159. Id. at 1161.
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following an administrative hearing was vacated by the state's inter-
mediate court, and the act was declared unconstitutional on grounds
of irrationality and excessive vagueness, as well as more familiar te-
nets of economic due process. 60
When C. V.S. Pharmacy Wayne reached the state supreme court,
that court reversed, sustaining the law's validity against claims that it
ran counter to principles of substantive due process. 161 Application of
a rational basis test resulted in an affirmation of the Legislature's ac-
tions under the state's police power. The level of scrutiny resorted to
was minimal. To charges of economic protectionism, the court re-
sponded with denials that particular groups had been placed at a com-
petitive disadvantage. Nor were the legislative classifications used
found to be violative of equal protection safeguards. While the out-
come paralleled federal precedents, the state court's style betrayed
subtle differences-a propensity to delve into statutory content and
context, to examine the purpose of the act, and to weigh the motivat-
ing factors that gave rise to it.362 Like results typify many of the state
cases touching upon economic due process but, as a commentator has
noted: "[R]eliance on explicit provisions of the state constitution can
provide a sound basis for the exercise of judicial review without the
appearance of a substitution of judicial value judgments." 1 63
G. Contract Clause
The Supreme Court's occasional reversion to the techniques of sub-
stantive due process led to incongruities within settings long thought
not to be susceptible to major judicial incursions. Of particular inter-
est was the revival of the Contract Clause in a series of cases extend-
ing from 1977 to the mid-1980s. In an incipient decision in an area
that had been dormant for almost half a century, United States Trust
Company of New York v. New Jersey'64 reestablished the Contract
Clause as an operative part of the Constitution. It mattered not
whether, as the Court phrased it, the "protection of contract rights
comports with current views of wise public policy.' ' 6
While the majority in United States Trust acknowledged the propri-
ety of deferring to the judgments of state legislatures, it noted that the
160. 541 A.2d 242 (N.J. Super. 1988).
161. 561 A.2d at 1164-65.
162. Id. at 1166-67.
163. Susan P. Fino, Remnants of the Past: Economic Due Process in the States, in HUmAN
RIGHTS, supra note 125, at 156, 158-59.
164. 431 U.S. 1 (1977).
165. Id. at 16.
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reserved power doctrine revealed a different basis when a state im-
paired the obligation of its own contracts.'61 The emergent standard
substituted a variable measure of judicial intervention for the vagaries
of due process. A "reasonable and necessary" test was devised to de-
termine whether impairment served a significant public purpose.167 To
a limited extent, the doctrine of deference was made to yield to inquir-
ies into legislative objectives. The choice among policy alternatives no
longer lay within the almost unfettered discretion of the states as poli-
cymakers. Court-inspired appraisals of societal needs were substituted
to a degree rarely seen since the 1930s.
The results represented an intrusion that, Justice William Brennan
warned in dissent, might entail "enormous institutional and social
costs.' 1 68 He described the prevailing opinion as a substantial misrep-
resentation of the course of contemporary constitutional jurispru-
dence and the portrayal of the Contract Clause as "wooden.' 1 69
Brennan depicted the reasonable and necessary test as a "most unu-
sual hybrid" and as "schizophrenic" in its impact.' 70 If Brennan's re-
course to hyperbole was not seriously considered as projecting a
major turnabout, it seemed equally careless to dismiss the Court's
venture into economic activism as no more than a random deviation
from accepted practices.
Subsequent federal cases reflected less intrusive guidelines than
those set out in United States Trust and its doctrinal offshoot, Allied
Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus.'7 ' The latter, if anything, extended
the reach of the Contract Clause to private contracts. Beyond Span-
naus lay a period of retrenchment as the Court began to reappraise
what the dissenters had pointed to as a revival of queries reminiscent
of a rancorous past. The possibility of a restatement, attributable to
the majority opinion in Spannaus, reached partial fruition in Energy
Reserves Group v. Kansas Power and Light Co. 172 When the state has
not sought to modify its own contractual obligations, the Court de-
clared, deferential principles generally apply, premised on standards
of review traditionally linked to economic and social regulatory
schemes.
166. Id. at 23-25.
167. Id. at 29.
168. Id. at 62 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
169. Id.
170. Id. at 54 n.17.
171. 438 U.S. 234 (1978).
172. 459 U.S. 400 (1983).
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Succeeding decisions, 73 representing a cross-section of the Court,
continued to bring the Contract Clause to a less incursive level than
that which might have been anticipated from a reading of United
States Trust. An intermingling of Contract Clause and Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendment due process predicates presaged a return to
deferential review, although a reservation persisted distinguishing pri-
vate from governmental obligations. All the same, a spirit of modera-
tion ensued. The reemergence of the Contract Clause and due process
variations as independent devices endured. But they served as less per-
vasive substitutes than much-condemned, direct applications of eco-
nomic due process. Fears of a recurrence of extravagant displays of
judicial negativism receded and were rendered increasingly remote in a
Court basically committed to deference. The latter seemed likely to
prevail, albeit without a boundless presumption of validity-a pre-
sumption that no longer could be perceived as obligatory.
Initially, the Supreme Court's return to the Contract Clause evoked
visages of a like revival in the state courts. Indeed, in Flushing Na-
tional Bank v. Municipal Assistance Corp., 74 the New York Court of
Appeals had already acted to invalidate a state moratorium statute,
postponing the payment of principal on short-term municipal bonds.
The state's highest court moved to preclude federal intervention by
ruling on independent state grounds, and the outcome seemed to place
an inordinate burden on a beleaguered city threatened with impending
default. The sanctity of private property rights was sustained by reli-
ance on a "faith and credit" provision of the state constitution.171 Yet
the judgment, it appeared, was less expressive of a probusiness philos-
ophy than a desire to ensure the survival of investor confidence by
eschewing a cavalier resort to a moratorium-a temporary nostrum of
dubious long-term efficacy or value.
Apart from the New York court's findings in the Flushing Bank
case, there was a disposition in the state courts to follow federal deci-
sional law, as it has developed since United States Trust, in resolving
contract impairment disputes. A sampling of cases reveals little inter-
est in shifting to state analogues as predicates of decision making. 76
173. National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry., 470 U.S. 451
(1985); Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp. v. R.A. Gray & Co., 467 U.S. 717 (1984); Exxon v.
Eagerton, 462 U.S. 176 (1983).
174. 358 N.E.2d 848 (N.Y. 1976).
175. Id. at 851.
176. A notable exception occurred in Ohio regarding the retirement of a city school district's
tax anticipation notes. State ex rel. National City Bank v. Board of Educ., 369 N.E.2d 1200
(Ohio 1977). Another departure from the doctrine of deference took place in California where
the state supreme court declined to sanction the abrogation of negotiated public employee wage
contracts tied to voter approval of Proposition 13. Sonoma County Org. of Public Employees v.
County of Sonoma, 591 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1979).
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Nor was any concerted effort made to insulate the results from federal
review. The motivating factors that encouraged state constitutional
activism regarding libertarian causes were missing with respect to the
Contract Clause and its state-related counterparts. Federal models ap-
parently served the exercise of the state's police power and its applica-
tion in diverse settings.' 77 It is doubtful that more stringent standards
will be pursued in the foreseeable future. To the same degree that
state substantive due process decisions have replicated the federal Su-
preme Court's analytical framework, contract clause holdings, of var-
ied impact and premised on changing federal precedents, have
conformed to deferential patterns traditionally linked to the economic
and social regulatory sphere.
III. CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS
As the preceding survey reveals, the past several decades have wit-
nessed a remarkable devolution of judicial power and leadership to
the state courts. American constitutionalism no longer may be re-
garded in monolithic terms, centering almost exclusively on the Su-
preme Court's work. Instead, the rich diversity as well as less
auspicious displays associated with developments in the federal system
have become abundantly evident. An historic reliance on the state
courts, dating from the early years of the Republic and predating the
impressive hegemony of the Supreme Court, in some ways has been
revived, though the issues and questions raised reflect an era decidedly
different from its predecessor. The Framers, despite their much-noted
clairvoyance, would have difficulty in reconciling contemporary no-
tions with late eighteenth century beliefs and constitutional texts.
What might be familiar is the basic institution of judicial review;
though its current breadth, the range of problems that it treats, and its
ramifications for the formulation of public policy would not be read-
ily recognizable. Nor would any characterization of state courts as
agenda-setters fall within their reading of constitutionally derived or
defensible precepts.
More intelligible to the Framers would be a judicial dedication to
the protection of property, embodying liberty interests as they were
known at the time. Yet the activism of contemporary state courts ex-
tends only minimally, if at all, to updated versions of a property-ori-
ented economic due process. To the contrary, there is a tendency to
177. See, e.g., Orr v. County Comm., 359 S.E.2d 109 (W. Va. 1987); Chevy Chase Savings
& Loan v. State, 509 A.2d 670 (Md. 1986); Edgewater Investment Associates v. Borough of
Edgewater, 510 A.2d 1178 (N.J. 1986).
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follow almost undeviatingly the deferential patterns attributable to the
Supreme Court. Why, it may be asked, does this propensity exist
when the state courts are in a position to assess more intimately and
critically than the federal Supreme Court what may have gone awry in
the executive-legislative process, particularly transgressions involving
special interests? There is no legacy of crisis in the states comparable
to the events that threatened to compromise the institutional status of
the Supreme Court in the late 1930s. Indeed, during the 1940s and
early 1950s, a number of state appellate courts did take on an inter-
ventionist posture, at times marked by opinions making reference to
substantive due process precedents abandoned earlier by the Supreme
Court. It is not clear why most of the state courts have been disin-
clined to reassume such responsibilities. Doubtless creative contribu-
tions-not necessarily or intrinsically negative in their reach-could be
made without the incurrence of liabilities analogous to those linked to
social Darwinism and its errant repercussions.
If, in fact, the recent resuscitation of state constitutional law was
reactive to the lack of expansive civil liberties initiatives in the Burger
Court, the continued, well-nigh paramount attention of many of the
state courts to the enhancement of libertarian interests still remains
enigmatic. The nationalization of the Bill of Rights during the Warren
years ought to have put to rest any doubts concerning the protection
of freedom, whether in state or federal courts. As a result, a recurrent
reliance on state counterpart safeguards might be taken to signal an
assault, however subtle or unintended, upon the preeminence of the
Bill of Rights and a general downgrading of national constitutional
guarantees. The danger always exists that, at times, a resort to inde-
pendent state grounds may be a subterfuge to undermine individual
rights by negating opportunities for appeal to the federal courts.
There are also suspicions, perhaps remote, of a return to provincial-
ism in the development of American constitutional law. Will this en-
courage irresponsibility on the part of the Supreme Court? Are state
judges being invested with or grasping for excessive power? Are they
motivated by an animus against centralization and a distaste for the
inroads upon the federalism of yesteryear rather than an undesigning
interest in promoting a dynamic constitutional order? Should the
range of rights available to a litigant depend upon happenstance, that
is, the accident of a person's state of residence at the time that a suit is
instituted? Will this, where possible, lead to "forum-shopping,"
much in the manner of pre-Erie178 corporate maneuvers in diversity
178. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
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proceedings? Are liberties, unlike economic arrangements, to be sub-
ject to persistent state experimentation even though diminution has
been presumed to be precluded by the nationalization process? Is
there reason why, in the past, preferences have been expressed for fed-
eral constitutional and statutory protection even when the moving
party is the apparent loser? 1 9 Or are Americans no longer willing to
sacrifice for the primacy of a federal holding?
Critical repugnance to what some perceive to be an ultra-conserva-
tive Rehnquist Court may result in a fundamental alteration of the
nation's constitutional development. But a calculated shift to the state
courts, premised primarily on dissatisfaction with the views of sitting
Justices, ought not to be seriously advanced as a determinant of long-
term directions. To do so places in jeopardy the probity of judicial
review as it has evolved over two centuries of constitutional history.
The values of national dominion in a constitutional sense outweigh
any temporary gains that may be realized if state courts are made to
serve merely as mechanisms of evasion, in effect, to "reverse" unpop-
ular Supreme Court decisions. There is a need for state courts to pro-
vide principled, reasoned opinions, not result-oriented decisions
designed solely to achieve particular ends. If state courts are to be the
initial sources in support of rights derived from state constitutions, s°
the quest for "neutral" principles takes on added significance.
Notwithstanding these animadversions, the future prospects of state
constitutional law seem bright in a federal system that for too long
has neglected essential components of judicial federalism. As an ill-
conceived displacement of federal judicial authority is untoward and
counterproductive, so the earlier view of state courts as supplicants
made for an improper and artificial imbalance. An era of mutual, in-
teractive fulfillment lies ahead. It is only in a spirit of cooperation
that the best products of American constitutionalism will be realized.
State appellate courts, drawing upon a vast storehouse of historical
and contemporary resources predicated on state constitutions and pre-
cedents, are strategically well-suited to provide creative solutions to a
broad range of nascent problems. Amendments to state constitutions
reflect more speedily the fluctuating views of American society than
do infrequent alterations of the national Constitution limited, for the
most part, to procedural and structural changes. Rights of privacy,
environmental protection provisions, equal rights guarantees, and
other innovative reforms have been found in recent additions to state
179. See, e.g., the labor preemption case, Guss v. Utah Labor Relations Bd., 353 U.S. 1
(1957).
180. Linde, supra note 25.
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constitutions.'8' Because many state judges are elected and serve for
fixed terms, they are hypothetically more accountable to the people
than are the Justices of the Supreme Court. Consequently, the demo-
cratic impetus comes into play, providing links to the popular will.
The adverse side of what at first appears to be a positive advantage
lies in this very proximity to the electorate, thereby promoting fears of
politicized judges prone to adopt ephemeral schemes that may menace
constitutional rights.
Initiative and referendum mechanisms, where they exist, pose addi-
tional threats to an activist judiciary bent on advancing causes that
prove to be unpopular. While the initiative and referendum has not
been as damaging to individual rights and liberties as opponents often
charge, 182 the danger always exists that the independence of the state
courts may be undermined. Popular democracy in California has had
baneful effects upon an acclaimed court system, though the judges
have demonstrated notable resourcefulness in skirmishes to ensure
that they remain significant expositors of the constitution and sta-
tutes.'83 Safeguards need to be introduced to place individual rights
and liberties beyond the ken of the initiative and referendum. Other-
wise, the threat persists that the procedure can provide a general war-
rant to invade previously inviolable spheres of activity or to undo
doctrinal pronouncements. Such a misuse of the initiative and referen-
dum, substituting popular whims for considered judgments, may en-
courage a negative reaction to the basic device itself when passions
have subsided and reason and moderation once again have prevailed.
If state courts are to prosper as significant decision makers, judges
must be wary of resorting to tempting but potentially pernicious arti-
fices. Purposeful efforts to divert explosive issues to the Supreme
Court,8 4 though perhaps expedient, ultimately defile the state courts
and render their pronouncements less credible and enduring. State
courts have artfully used federal precedents to break new ground or to
strengthen what has been projected. 85 But an overt ruse compromises
181. See, e.g., FLA. CoNsT. art. I, § 23 (privacy). For a useful listing (by subject area) of
substantive amendments to state constitutions since 1970, see Janice C. May, Constitutional
Amendment and Revision Revisited, 17 PutLrus: J. FEDERALISM 153, 172-74 (1987). See also
Mark L. Glasser & John Kincaid, Selected Rights Enumerated in State Constitutions, 17 INTER-
GoVT'L PERsp. 31 (1991).
182. See Janice C. May, The Constitutional Initiative: A Threat to Rights?, in HUMAN
RIHTS, supra note 125, at 163.
183. See Calvin R. Massey, The "Underlying Principle" of the Independence of the Califor-
nia Constitution, 2 STATE CoNsSrr. CoMENTAREs AND Norms 1-4 (Winter 1991).
184. See, e.g., Bakke v. Regents of the University of California, 553 P.2d 1152 (Cal. 1976).
185. People v. Onofre, 415 N.E.2d 936 (N.Y. 1980).
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the status of a state court and weakens time-honored traditions of ac-
commodation and comity in the federal system.
To like effect, repeated, open clashes between the state's highest
court and the federal Supreme Court ought not to be indulged cava-
lierly. State judges are ill-advised to reject, without compelling cause,
the findings of the Supreme Court in cases incontrovertibly similar in
their constitutional bases, scope, and factual details. Otherwise, de-
partures from federal norms may prove to be excessively venturesome
and costly. Officiously contrary results, like those in the 1990 New
Jersey garbage disposal case, 8 6 squander reserves of public trust and
good will. The fabric of judicial review, sustaining occasional thrusts
of judicial activism, may be needlessly jeopardized as a result. Overt
clashes ought to be selective in their reach and limited to cases where
the gravity of the interests at stake merit such actions.
If the development of theoretical and methodological foundations is
made to serve as one of the principal criteria of the status of state
constitutional law, much remains to be accomplished. Pragmatism
and strong tendencies toward result orientation continue to provide
the salient guidelines for judicial decision making. Suggestions for a
modus operandi range from a "first things first" standard8 7 that em-
phasizes the primacy of state courts and state constitutions to more
sophisticated decisional yardsticks. As a point of origin, the "plain
statement rule," in relation to the nature of the precedents cited and
relied upon, was set forth in 1983 by the Supreme Court in Michigan
v. Long.'88 A decision premised on independent state grounds, the
Court declared, must be based explicitly on an interpretation of the
state constitution. Federal precedents may be considered so long as
they do not "compel" the results reached.
Beyond such hints lie more ambitious efforts intended not only to
meet the requirements of Michigan v. Long, but also to establish neu-
tral criteria as the basis for the extension of rights more expansive
than those provided in the federal Constitution. The process must be
articulable, reasonable, and reasoned. To this end, Justice James An-
dersen of the Supreme Court of Washington fashioned the Gunwall' 9
186. State v. Hempele, 576 A.2d 793 (N.J. 1990).
187. Linde, supra note 25.
188. 463 U.S. 1032 (1983). Cf. Coleman v. Thompson, 111 S. Ct. 2546 (1991) (Presumption
that state decision is based on federal grounds does not apply to dismissal of state court appeal,
thus permitting federal habeas review.); Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255 (1989) (Plain statement
rule applies to federal habeas proceedings so that procedural default does not bar consideration
of federal claim on review unless the state court explicitly states that its judgment rests on state
law.).
189. State v. Gunwall, 720 P.2d 808 (Wash. 1986). For a cogent review of the Gunwall stan-
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standards establishing nonexclusive criteria built around the state con-
stitutional text, differences in counterpart provisions, historical data
that support independent state grounds, structural differences between
national and state constitutions, and local traditions and concerns
promoting diversity. So-called "divergence" criteria and attempted
applications appeared in a dissent in the New Jersey garbage disposal
case,190 but their effectiveness remains problematic. In sum, the effort
to define and to follow "neutral principles" remains as elusive in state
constitutional law as it has in federal constitutional law.191
Apart from such glimmers of "principled" adjudicatory techniques
espoused intermittently in the case law and in the literature, the most
compelling test lies in the success or failure of judicial federalism.
State constitutional law does not exist as a discrete entity provincially
derived and separately maintained. It is a part of the American experi-
ment in constitutionalism (especially its federalist components) as it
has manifested itself during the past two centuries. Its major contribu-
tions require an appropriate balance between the nationalization of
American law, as reflected in the Supremacy Clause of Article VI of
the Constitution and its decisional progeny, measured against the val-
ues of a diverse jurisprudence rooted in the states. The notion of a
sharply competitive scheme, matching state courts as rivals against
federal courts, can only be counterproductive. In a collaborative
spirit, the creative contributions of both can best be brought to frui-
tion. Neither a narrow parochialism nor an excessive centralization
will facilitate the unusual spurts of energy, resourcefulness, and inno-
vation that distinguish a variegated system. 92
Two examples provide measures of the efficacy of the system in the
last decade of the twentieth century. The flag burning cases, 193 re-
ferred to in the introduction to this Article, represented valuable state
contributions to judicial federalism absent the intervention of the Su-
preme Court. There was no cause for federal decisions in 1989 and
1990, both of which added minimally, if at all, to First Amendment
doctrine. The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas had adequately
dards, see Charles H. Sheldon, "All Sail and No Anchor" in New Federalism Cases-Attempted
Remedial Efforts by the Supreme Court of Washington, 1 STATE CoNsrrr. CoMMsNTRIs AND
NoTEs 5, 8-13 (Winter 1990).
190. State v. Hempele, 576 A.2d 793 (N.J. 1990).
191. See Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HAv. L.
REv. 1 (1959) and the debates among "academic critics" that it spawned.
192. See Stanley H. Friedelbaum, Reactive Responses: The Complementary Role of Federal
and State Courts, 17 PutaLns: J. FEDERAa.SM 33 (1987).
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dealt with the questions raised' 94 by an adroit resort to accepted prin-
ciples of expressional freedom. In relation to personal autonomy,
should the Supreme Court expressly overrule Roe v. Wade,195 the state
courts (and legislatures) will confront a major test of their ability to
respond to controversies touching upon political and emotional issues
of the first magnitude. Will the devolution of powers and functions to
the state courts, so often acclaimed as the "new" federalism, prove
adept in meeting such a challenge? Alternately, is there danger of a
return to an unbridled divisiveness that will threaten, once again and
perhaps more pointedly, the essential unity of the nation as a fount of
basic liberties and rights? Future events may well afford opportunities
for a determination of the effectiveness of judicial federalism in its
finest or least laudable hour.
194. Johnson v. State, 755 S.W.2d 92 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988).
195. 410U.S. 113 (1973).
